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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
contested.
It is acknowledged that the Utah Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over final orders, judgments
and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction and if this matter were a final order,

the appropriate jurisdiction would be with the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2 (j), Utah Code
Annotated•
Respondent has previously filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition claiming this appeal is not from a
final order.

The Court denied the Motion by Minute

Entry dated February 13, 1991, but reserved ruling on
the issue for plenary presentation and consideration
of the case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues to be considered on appeal are as
follows:
1.

The Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury

Verdict did not end the controversy between the
parties and, therefore, is not an appealable final
judgment.

The standard of review is whether it is

apparent on the face of the record that the
controversy between the parties has been concluded in
all respects.

See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600

P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
2.

The District court was correct in setting

aside the jury verdict by applying Florida law to the
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.

The trial

court standard must be based upon whether or not the

moving party (in this case the Respondent) is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

In reviewing this

decision, the Appellate Court gives no deference to
the trial Court's legal conclusions, but reviews them
for correctness.

See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14,

17 (Utah 1988) .
3.

The other issues presented in appellant's

brief concern the Court*s factual findings in
connection with the application of Florida law. The
standard for review is whether the findings of fact
are clearly erroneous.

See Barker v. Francis, 741

P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATE STATUTES
U.C.A. §75-2-201(2)
Right to elective share.
If a married person not domiciled in
this state dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an
elective share in the property in this
state is governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death except as
to provided in Subsection (3).
F.S.A. 732.702
Waiver of right to elect and of other
rights.
(1) The right of election of a
surviving spouse, the rights of
the surviving spouse as intestate
successor or as a pretermitted
spouse, and the rights of the
surviving spouse to homestead,
exempt property, and family
allowance, or any of them, may be
waived, wholly or partly, before

or after marriage, by a written
contract, agreement, or waiver,
signed by the waiving party.
Unless it provides to the contrary,
a waiver of "all rights", or
equivalent language, in the property
or estate of a present or prospective
spouse, or a complete property
settlement entered into after, or in
anticipation of, separation,
dissolution of marriage, or divorce,
is a waiver of all rights to elective
share, intestate share, pretermitted
share, homestead property, exempt
property, and family allowance by
each spouse in the property of the
other and a renunciation by each of
all benefits that would otherwise
pass to either from the other by
intestate succession or by the
provisions of any will executed
before the waiver or property
settlement.
(2) Each spouse shall make a fair
disclosure to the other of his or
her estate if the agreement, contract,
or waiver is executed after marriage.
No disclosure shall be required for
an agreement, contract, or waiver
executed before marriage.
(3) No consideration other than the
execution of the agreement, contract,
or waiver shall be necessary to its
validity, whether executed before or
after marriage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(This is a factual history of the case.

It

is presented here rather than under the Statement of
Facts because it details the course of proceedings and
nature of the case.)
On February 19, 1987, the heirs of
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for Family Allowance. (R37,38) At the same time, she
also filed a Notice of her intent, as the spouse of
the deceased, to claim an elective share, thereby
denouncing her right to take pursuant to the
deceasedls Will. (R45)

In her supporting Memorandum,

she claimed that the pre-nuptial agreement she signed
was void because she did not receive fair disclosure.
On July 29, 1988, the Court granted appellant
a $600.00 monthly family allowance. (R78)
Thereafter, appellant petitioned the Court
for additional expenses to cover the costs of
emergency and serious dental problems. (R163,165)

By

Memorandum Decision dated October 11, 198 9, the Court
authorized the incurrence of extra-ordinary medical
expenses on behalf of the appellant and ordered the
estate to pay for the same, reserving however the
decision as to whether or not the expenses were a
legitimate family expense and whether or not a
reimbursement or offset to the estate of any amounts
expended would be appropriate. (R229-231)
On January 16, 1990, Attorney
Michael J. Glasmann filed a Motion to Intervene
claiming that he represented Michael L. Hemmert and
Linda M. Hemmert, and that they possessed a special
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disclosure and the pre-nuptial agreement was therefore
invalid, (R355)
Respondent had made a motion at the beginning
of the trial to apply Florida law as to the question
of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.

There

was a conference in chambers which referred to a
conference call that had occurred the preceding Monday
when the motion was initially made..

This exchange

occurred during the in-chambers conference:
MR. FLORENCE:
To the extent that a record needs
to be protected in advance of
today*s jury trial and to the
extent that Mr. Glasmann was not
a party to that conference call
and perhaps should have been, I
wanted to restate and perhaps
elaborate the motion that was
made and the reasoning for it.
All of the parties, through their
counsel, appeared before this
Court on March 13, 1990 at a
pre-trial and settlement
conference. Mr. Glasmann was
here at that time, having
previously filed a motion to
intervene on behalf of one of
the heirs, Michael Hemmert.
There was considerable discussion
at that hearing concerning the
interpretation of Utah's elective
share formula. The Court
indicated at that time that it
tended to construe that formula
in the same manner as Mr. Glasmann
had suggested it should be construed.

As a result of that, the three of
us once again appeared in front of
this court on March 27th, 1990, two
weeks later, in which there was a
proposed settlement agreement
entered into between all of the
parties and which was going to
comprise the respective claims
based upon all of our various
positions.
On April 22nd, I believe, —
strike that. Shortly thereafter
Mr. Hadfield prepared and circulated
to both Mr. Glasmann and myself a
settlement agreement which
incorporated in basic terms the
agreement that was stated on the
record on March 27th. On April the
22nd, I believe, Mr. Hadfield wrote
to me and to Mr. Glasmann informing
us that his client wouldn't accept
that proposal and suggested that it
was determined that Mr. Hemmert was
not a domicile of Utah but in fact
a domicile of Florida and Florida's
elective share would then apply,
which would provide to her a much
greater amount of Mr. Hemmertls
estate than provided for under
Utah*s elective share.
I asked Mr. Hadfield to send me
not only the evidence that he had
to suggest that Mr. Hemmert was a
domicile of Florida, but also to
help persuade me that Florida law
was indeed different as it related
to the elective share.
In May, and I have a letter here,
but I think it was about May 15th,
I received from Mr. Hadfield various
documents which persuaded me that
his argument that Mr. Hemmert was a
domicile of Florida was strong.
I called him about the Florida
statutes and he indicated that he

had not yet received those from the
Florida lawyer whom he had been
communicating with. Perhaps to my
fault I waited too long before I
undertook my own research on the
Florida law, during which time it
was discovered that if Florida
law — that under Florida law the
standard for the validity of a
pre-nuptial agreement is different*
The Utah standard requires fair
disclosure. The Florida standard
requires no disclosure at all, it
only requires an execution of the
pre-nuptial agreement. That was
the purpose of my phone call on
Monday, to suggest that if the
petitioner in this case, Mrs.
Hemmert, was going to take the
position that Mr. Hemmert was a
Florida domicile, if that was her
position then Florida law ought to
apply as to the validity of the
pre-nuptial agreement.
At that time Mr. Hadfield argued
that Utah law should apply as to
the validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement since the pre-nuptial
agreement was entered into in this
state, the parties were married in
this state, and most of the property
was in this state. You expressed
in that phone conference that you
tended to agree with that and that
would be your ruling.
Since that time, Your Honor, I've
had an opportunity to do some
additional research, and very
frankly it is a little scarce,
but I have prepared for submittal
to you an annotation from ALR 2nd,
Volume 18, and two cases out of
the state of Ohio — excuse me.
One case out of the state of Ohio,
1966, and one out of Wisconsin
from 1959, which suggest that the

place that the pre-nuptial
agreement is prepared or executed
is not a relevant — is not the
only relevant factor to consider
in deciding which law should
apply to its validity, but that
the matrimonial domicile would
be the law to determine the
validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement,
THE COURT:
By matrimonial, do you mean the
place of residence or the place
of marriage?
MR. FLORENCE:
The place of residence during
their marriage. We are prepared
to concede that the matrimonial
domicile, for purposes of this
argument, was in fact Florida.
That's where they lived together
for most of their married life,
although they did visit here
during some of the summers, but
that's where they considered
their home to be was in the state
of Florida.
I would submit and urge the Court
to once again reconsider its prior
ruling and ask that the issue in
this case be limited to whether or
not Mrs. Hemmert executed the
pre-nuptial agreement and if so
rule as a matter of law that she
is bound by the pre-nuptial
agreement, because the Florida
statute as to the fact that no
disclosure is required would apply.
I will leave with the Court the two
cases I've referred to, the ALR
citation as well as the Florida
statute on the pre-nuptial agreement
and some Florida cases that have
confirmed that that's what they
really mean. (T5-9)

-i i -

Respondent's motion became necessary because
for the entire extent of the proceedings up to just a
few weeks before the trial, appellant had taken the
position that the deceased was domiciled in the State
of Utah and, therefore, Utah's elective share would
apply. After the discussion with the Court at the
hearing on March 13, 1990 when it appeared to the
appellant that the elective share formula under Utah
law would not favor her, she subsequently changed her
position and then claimed the decedent was a domicile
of Florida because, according to her, the Florida
elective share law would be more advantageous.
Therefore, the motion to apply Florida law to the
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement did not come up
until just before trial. As a result, additional
discussion occurred with the Court.
MR. FLORENCE:
The problem with that argument,
it sounded pretty good at the
time Ben made it, but if the
jury comes back and says there
was fair disclosure, it's true
that issue, as far as we're
concerned, is now resolved
whether you apply Utah law or
Florida law. But if they don't,
in my view then it's not a final
judgment. He will have all kinds
of collateral issues that you yet
will need to resolve before
kicking it up to the Supreme Court.
So you're going to have one or two

or perhaps three more trials or
three more issues to be tried if
we get to that posture,
THE COURT:
Such as you mean the family?
MR. FLORENCE:
Such as whether or not he was a
domicile of Florida, if Florida
law applies to the elective share.
If it does not what was in the
marital estate to apply the Utah
elective share and what is
Florida's elective share. I still
haven't seen it. In due respect
to Mr. Hadfield, I still haven't
seen that authority.
THE COURT:
And then you have all the
questions about the appropriate
deductions which are being taken.
MR. FLORENCE:
And then the expenses of this
estate. That's where Mr.
Glasmann's primary concern comes
in, whether or not half of it is
in or half is out.
THE COURT:
It seems to me I'm being presented
really with facts to determine
that I don't have enough facts to
determine as to the domicile.
MR. GLASMANN:
Could I intersect. I agree
completely with Your Honor. I was
trying to put myself in your shoes
as to how you get yourself in a
position to even instruct the jury
in this case. It seems to me that
logically the domicile issue has to
be determined first. Then secondly
you have to determine the conflict
of laws question and then you have

to instruct the jury. It is
unfortunate that we're this far
along with those issues unresolved.
THE COURT:
Since you called and since I was
aware of the problem, I've been
thinking, and it's catching me a
little cold, too. I think you all
recognize that. I have a jury
sitting out there. I think I've
got to, even taking your position,
Ben, if we look at the most
significant contacts and if we're
applying Utah corporation law, I
think, based on what I'm hearing
today, there are some disputes
about the significant contacts.
If they're on a bus heading out
of Utah and get married and that
agreement is entered into ancillary
to where they are really going to
live, and plus they met in Florida
and he lives in Florida, or at
least arguably lives in Florida.
(T16-18)
After further discussion, it was agreed that
the trial would proceed only on the issue of the
validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.

This exchange

then occurred:
THE COURT:
That will give me time to do a
little work on this issue. I might
indicate to you that I think there
are legitimate questions here. I
do have some struggle, Ben. I was
under the impression that there
were a whole lot more contact here
than now I'm being aware of. Maybe
preliminarily there were on his
part, but if she didn't ever live
here, if she just came here for
the purpose of helping him move,

essentially, and while here they
enter into this thing and enter
into it here, and then leave and
get married and are gone, then I
really would want to read those
cases and the law.
MR, HADFIELD:
And I think the evidence will
show they did reside in Florida.
They were back here every year to
Utah together and they maintained
an apartment 12 months a year
here. So they still maintained
significant contacts here.
THE COURT:
And I don't dispute that.
MR. FLORENCEi
I apologize about the lateness of
this. I don't want to take all
the blame because this thing has
been pending for over two years
and Mr. Hadfield didn't raise the
issue of Florida law until three
months ago.
THE COURTi
Nobody is affixing blame here,
I'm only saying that we're all at
a disadvantage now. I guess the
buck stops here on the issue.
MR. HADFIELD:
I don't have any particular
problem with Mr. Glasmann's
participation in the argument
here. You're not going to
remain for the trial?
MR. GLASMANNi
There's just one other thing I
want to say. Actually, when we
withdrew the motion to intervene
it was my understanding that the
issues that would — the issue
that would be tried here would

be the issue of the validity of
the pre-nuptial agreement only
and that you would not be going
into questions of what should
be included in the estate or
what should not.
My client may testify, and I've
talked with Brian about this so
I'm sure he'll be objecting if
Ben tried to go into matters
that would be evidence on the
issue of what should be included
in the estate. I won't be here
to object and I just wanted
Your Honor to be aware that I
don't feel it's fair that if my
client does testify that they
venture into whether this contract
involves the Bushnell Motel and
should it be included in the
estate or not.
MR. HADFIELD;
They see the issue coming because
it's big as a locomotive. If his
client has a huge bias or selfinterest in the outcome of this
lawsuit, the jury is entitled to
know that.
MR. FLORENCE!
1*11 stipulate he does.
MR. HADFIELD:
A $290,000.00 interest.
MR. GLASMANN:
We agree that the jury is entitled
to know there's that interest. I
think the figures can be stated to
the jury and we agree there's a
bias, so that they are aware of
that connection. But then to go
into his testimony about the
background on the contract, I
would object to that happening
without my being here.

MR. HADFIELD:
Maybe we can fashion some kind of
stipulation.
MR. FLORENCEi
I think we can do that, yes.
THE COURT:
Okay. What I'd like you to do,
then, is give me alternative
instructions. The ones that I
have are based on Utah law. If
you'll just — they're just a
very small part. If you111 give
me the alternative instructions
and then 1*11 give you my ruling.
MR. FLORENCE:
It would be my position at this
time, Your Honor, that if you
apply Florida law you can do that
as a matter of law. She is not
contesting she did not sign a prenuptial agreement.
MR. HADFIELD:
You're saying in Florida if she
speaks only Spanish and no English
and puts her signature on that
line?
MR. FLORENCEz
You have never alleged fraud or
misrepresentation. You have
alleged failure to disclose.
MR. HADFIELD:
If you look at our pleadings, all
we've done is claim an elective
share. I cited fraud in my
memorandum, undue influence. I
used both of those terms.
THE COURT:
I guess we'll just have to wait
and see. If there's fraud in
the procuring of the signature,
then I suppose that's an issue
that they'd have to rule on.

MR. HADFIELD:
Even in Florida.
MR. FLORENCE!
Let's go see what happens.
(T21-25)
After the trial, the parties were given
additional time to brief their respective positions
and on August 10, 1990, the Judge entered his
Memorandum Decision setting aside the jury verdict and
concluding that Florida law would apply. (R367-371)
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and an Order were prepared by the estate's counsel
and submitted to appellant's counsel for review. A
hearing was conducted before the Court on
September 14, 1990, at which time the Court signed the
Findings and Order in open court. (R383-397)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual setting of what was presented to
the jury is not particularly relevant to these
proceedings.

The jury obviously made their decision

based upon how they viewed the evidence presented.
The primary factual aspect of this case that is
relevant is contained in the Statement of the Case
preceding this section.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case is clearly not ripe for appeal.

There are many issues yet to be decided.

In any

event, the Court was correct in applying Florida law
in determining the validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement.
ARGUMENT
I
THE JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT
DID NOT END THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT AN APPEALABLE FINAL
JUDGMENT.
It is clear from the recitation of the
history of this case that there are still several
issues to be resolved.

Michael Glasmann, who

attempted to intervene on behalf of Michael Hemmert,
is asserting a claim that the single largest asset of
the estate, a motel, should not be included in the
estate by reason of an agreement that he had with his
father, the deceased, and the rest of the heirs.
(R256-262)

The resolution of that dispute will

obviously affect appellant's share of the estate
irrespective of the outcome of this appeal. Appellant
contests the validity of the agreement Michael Hemmert
claims to have had with the deceased and the other
heirs.
There is also the dispute as to whether or
not the application of Floridafs law will change the

amount available to appellant.

She has claimed that

Florida law prohibits a surviving spouse from
receiving anything less than a fee interest in their
residence. Mr. Hemmert's Will only gives her a life
estate.
The deceasedls Will contained a provision
concerning the includability of his social security
benefits and their deductibility from appellant's
distributive share. Appellant has disputed the manner
in which this would be included.

The Will also

contained a no-contest clause and since appellant
contested the Will, its validity is yet to be
resolved.
Based upon the resolution of the social
security benefits, there is also an issue as to
whether or not appellant has exceeded the amount to
which she is entitled by reason of her having received
a substantial widow1s allowance since the death of
Mr. Hemmert.
There is also the issue that the Court
reserved earlier about the includability and the
appropriateness of the amended widow*s family
allowance for the dental benefits paid to appellant.
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure permits appeals from District Court "final
orders and judgments".

The jury trial, its verdict

and the subsequent judgment notwithstanding the
verdict have only addressed one issue out of the many
yet to be resolved in this probate.

Irrespective of

the outcome of this appeal, if it is permitted at this
time, other issues will still remain unsolved and
subject to future appeals. While a decision of this
Court may limit the number of other issues to be
resolved, it does not change the fact that this case
is not completed.
For instance, if this Court concludes that
the trial judge was correct in granting the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and that Florida law
should have been applied to the validity of the
pre-nuptial agreement and appellant is bound to take
under the terms of the deceased*s Will, there are all
of the potential issues referred to above still to be
decided.
On the other hand, if this Court should
conclude that the Court erred in granting the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and that Utah law should
be applied to the validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement, then the jury verdict would be binding.

That would still leave the issues of Florida1s law
versus Utah's law as to the definition of appellant's
elective share and the size of the estate by reason of
the claim of Michael Hemmert and appellant's receipt
of prior benefits.
II
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN SETTING
ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT AND APPLYING FLORIDA
LAW AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PRE-NUPTIAL
AGREEMENT.
Up until three months before trial, appellant
had never suggested that the deceased was a domicile
of Florida.

She had always maintained her right to an

elective share under Utah's elective share statute.
(R45)

When she raised that issue, it was because she

believed that Florida's formula for calculating her
elective share would be more beneficial to her.
It then became apparent to the respondent
that if Florida law were to be applied in determining
an elective share, it should also be applied to the
validity vel non of the pre-nuptial agreement.

Since

the issue was not raised until just before trial, the
Court proceeded with the trial and reserved ruling on
the "conflicts" question until the verdict was given.
A different jury verdict would have made the issue
moot.

When it became necessary to rule, the Court
entered specific findings as to the issue of domicile,
as follows:
3. That the petitioner is an
immigrant from Hungary, having
been previously married and
divorced. She moved to the
United States, having worked in
Hungary as a secretary, including
a secretary for a lawyer. She
had lived in the United States for
some period of time prior to
meeting the deceased. She met the
deceased who was vacationing in
Florida and after a rather brief
courtship, the two were married.
4. That the deceased was a
resident of Box Elder County and
was previously married for some
thirty (30) years, having had a
family, his wife died and he began
to travel. In the court of his
travel, he met the petitioner in
Florida where she resided. He
subsequently returned to Florida
where a brief courtship took place
and then he returned to Utah.
5. That the petitioner subsequently
traveled to Utah for a period of
time, maintaining her residence in
Florida, but taking an apartment in
Logan, Utah. She and the deceased
received a marriage license in Cache
County. A pre-nuptial agreement was
prepared in Box Elder County and
subsequently executed and notarized,
as were accompanying Wills of the
parties. The parties then traveled
back to Florida to reside and were
married in transit in Central/
Southern Utah. The parties set up
the marital domicile and resided in
Florida until the deceased*s death.
(R385-386)
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The Judge also found:
7. That it is uncontroverted that
Florida law requires only that a
pre-nuptial agreement be executed
as contrasted with Utah law which
requires adequate disclosure•...
(R386)
The Court's Conclusions of Law provided:
1. That a review of the precedent
submitted indicates that there is
a differing approach established
by many of the cases in the
interpretation of marital contracts.
This approach is, essentially, that
the matrimonial domicile is a better
indicated of the intention of the
parties as to the interpretation
and enforcement of contracts and
relationships, in 11 ANJR Conflicts
of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it
states in part that:
Where the marriage takes
place in the state in
which the woman has been
domiciled but, with the
intention of the parties,
which is carried out
within a reasonable time,
of establishing their
common house in another
state in which the
husband is domiciled,
the marital rights of
the parties in the
personal property of
each other owned at the
time of the marriage is
governed, as a general
rule, by the law of the
state of their
contemplated and
subsequently established
matrimonial domicile;
such state is to be
deemed their initial
matrimonial domicile.

This approach has been taken by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
Florida, Alabama, Illinois,
Louisiana, Ohio and New York,
although it is conceded that
there is a difference of opinion
among many Courts as to whether
the validity of these agreements
is to be determined by the law of
the place where they are made or
by the law of the matrimonial
domicile.
2. That the Court observes that
there has been no claim, nor is
there any evidence that there was
fraud or misrepresentation in the
initial entering into of the
agreement and the Court
specifically finds there was none.
The petitioner's position is,
essentially, that she was not
informed sufficiently by virtue
of the circumstances, including
her language disabilities.
3. That one of the closer cases
that the Court could find bearing
on this situation is the case of
Osborn v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern
Reporter 2d, Page 814, et. seq.
When faced with a similar question,
the Court there stated:
The state is concerned
in seeing that its
concepts of public
safety are enforced in
this area because
marriage is a status
exclusively regulated
and controlled by laws
of the state of the
parties• matrimonial
domicile.

The Court later stated:
There can be little
question that Ohio has
the most significant
contacts with and
paramount interest in
the parties, in the
agreement, and in
questions concerning
its validity. In
view of this conclusion,
it is incumbent upon
the Court to determine
the validity of the
antenuptial agreement
under Ohio law dealing
with this subject.
In the Ohio case, there was a
resident of Massachusetts and a
resident of Ohio. The contract
was executed in Massachusetts,
but the parties subsequently
resided in Ohio. This is a
situation much like the instant
case.
4. That in determining the
application of the law of the
state of Utah to the facts of this
case, it is helpful to the Court
to refer to Section 75-2-201 [2],
Utah Code Annotated, wherein it
provides:
If a married person
not domiciled in this
state dies, the right,
if any, of the surviving
spouse to take an
elective share in
property in this state
is governed by the law
of the decedent's domicile
at death
5. That the surviving spouses1
right to take an elective share,

which she is claiming, is dependent
upon the validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement. It appears to the Court
that the intention of the Legislature
of the state of Utah is consistent
with that of what the Court finds to
be the majority of the cases in the
domestic conflict of law area and
directs that those rights be
determined under the law of the
place of the decedent's domicile of
death, which is consistent with the
marital domicile of the parties in
this case and that the public
interests as stated in the Ohio case,
are consistent with the statutory
directive previously quoted.
6. That the Court finds that Florida
law is the applicable law and, as
provided in Florida statute 732.702
[1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure shall
be required for an agreement, contract
or waiver executed before marriage".
7. That based on the foregoing, the
Estate's Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict be and is
hereby granted. (R387-390)
As the judge has indicated, the
conflict-of-laws resolution really starts with the
application of Utah law.

It provides that:

The right, if any, of the surviving
spouse to take an elective share
in property in this state is
governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death . . . "
75-2-201(2), Utah Code Annotated.
Appellant acknowledges that the decedent was
a domicile of Florida at his death, but wants the
Court to apply a different conflict-of-laws standard

to this case and urges the significant contacts
standard instead.

This simply is not tenable in light

of the Utah statute.
This Court has therefore correctly applied
the law in concluding that the Florida statute was the
governing statute on the pre-nuptial agreement and
disclosure is not required.
Ill
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS FACTUALLY CORRECT IN
THE MANNER IT APPLIED FLORIDA LAW TO THE
PRE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT.
Appellant argues that even if the Court was
going to apply Florida law, it erred in finding a
"meeting of the minds" during the creation of the
pre-nuptial agreement or in failing to find fraud in
the inducement.
In considering the extent to which the
Florida courts would review pre-nuptial agreements in
light of the absence of a disclosure requirement, it
has been said that:
If a wife were able to show that
her signature on such an agreement
had been coerced or otherwise
improperly obtained or that she
was incompetent at the time she
signed, Section 732.702(2) would
not bar her challenge to the
validity of the agreement.
Estate of Roberts, 388 So.2d 216,
217 (Fla. 1980).

While these issues were not presented to the
jury, the Court specifically found no evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation.

Indeed, the Court found

that appellant's only claim was that she was not
informed sufficiently by virtue of the circumstances,
including her language disabilities.

(See Conclusions

of Law #2)
There were sufficient facts in this case to
allow the Court to make that determination.
Although appellant claims that she did not
understand what she was signing when she signed the
pre-nuptial agreement, she acknowledged in Answers to
Interrogatories tht when she signed the agreement,
Lyman told her that "they would both sign an agreement
and she would be treated as a member of his family,
just like his children".
Exhibit D-6)

(Interrogatory answer #62,

This was true and exactly what happened

under the terms of Mr. Hemmert's Will.
Mr. Dorius, the attorney who prepared the
pre-nuptial agreement and the Will, testified that
prior to the time the agreement was signed, he had met
with Mr. and Mrs. Hemmert and that she had brought in
a paper that she had written out that she wanted to
consider putting in the Will.

"She was negotiating

that she wanted put into the Will." (T170)

Defendant's Exhibit 1 was introduced which
was the paper Mr, Dorius said appellant brought to him
for inclusion in the Will. (T170)
Appellant acknowledged the document looked
like her handwriting, but she did not remember when
she made it. (T81)
Mr. Dorius stated that she had also made some
handwritten notes on the draft of the Will before the
final was prepared. (T171) (Defendant's Exhibit 2)
Appellant claimed she made those notes years
after the pre-nuptial agreement was signed, but could
not explain how she got an unsigned copy. (T83)
Mr. Dorius also claimed that appellant had
attorneys call him during the preparation phase of the
documents to assist her in understanding. (T174)
Appellant denied this. (T80)
These issues and allegations were not
necessarily conclusive, or even relevant, for the
jury's consideration as to whether appellant received
fair disclosure regarding Mr. Hemmert's assets.
However, these facts could certainly be used by the
Court in finding that there was no fraud or
misrepresentation.

Appellant cannot, by marshalling

all of the evidence, demonstrate that despite this

evidence, the Court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.

Hagan v.

Hagan, 158 UAR 66 (Utah App. 1991)
CONCLUSION
This case is not ripe for appeal.

If

reviewed, however, the trial Court was correct in its
decision to set aside the jury verdict and apply
Florida law on the validity of the pre-nuptial
agreement.
DATED this

\ Q -—day of May, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,
rLORENCE/-ftND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Respondent/
Personal Representative
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent,
postage prepaid, to Ben H. Hadfield, Attorney for
Appellant, P.O. Box 8 76, Brigham City, UT 843 02, on
this \£J^—aay of May, 1991.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka,
L. W. HEMMERT,
Probate No. 873006067
Deceased.
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial on
the 12th and 13th days of July, 1990, before the Honorable
F. L. Gunnell, Judge of the above-entitled Court.

The

Personal Representative of the above estate, Alonna Cook,
was present and represented by counsel, Brian R. Florence.
The widow of Lyman W. Hemmert and petitioner herein,
Rose Nagy Hemmert, was present and represented by counsel,
Ben H. Hadfield.
Immediately prior to trial, the Estate made a
Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or Motion in Limine with
the issue being the relevant law governing the
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.
FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON
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At that time, the Court denied the motion because there was
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and
the Estate was given the right to renew the motion at the
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conclusion of the trial.

The instruction given to the jury

by the Court essentially incorporated the law of the State
of Utah as being the applicable law with reference to the
interpretation of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement and that Utah
law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2) elements:
1.

A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement*

2.

Fair disclosure prior to or incident to
the signing of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement.

After deliberation/ the jury found in favor of the
petitioner finding that there was not adequate disclosure.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Estate renewed
their motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict.

The Court now having had an

opportunity to review all of the material submitted in
support and opposition to the Estate's motion, hereby files
its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the position of the Petitioner is

essentially that the matter is one of contract and that the
FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON

principles of contract law apply and that the law of the
jurisdiction where the contract was made controls; or the

ATTORNEYS AT
LAW
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law where there were significant contacts with the parties
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or the subject matter of the agreement should control.
2.

That the Estate's position is that in the areas

of interpretation of Pre-Nuptial Agreements, the law is
that the marital citus of the parties should control in the
interpretation of the document.
3.

That the petitioner is an immigrant from

Hungary, having been previously married and divorced.

She

moved to the United States, having worked in Hungary as a
secretary, including a secretary for a lawyer.

She had

lived in the United States for some period of time prior to
meeting the deceased.

She met the deceased who was

vacationing in Florida and after a rather brief courtship,
the two were married.
4.

That the deceased was a resident of Box Elder

County and was previously married for some thirty (30)
years, having had a family, his wife died and he began to
travel.

In the course of his travel, he met the petitioner

in Florida where she resided.

He subsequently returned to

Florida where a brief courtship took place and then he
FLORENCE
and
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returned to Utah.
5.
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That the petitioner subsequently traveled to

Utah for a period of time, maintaining her residence in
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Florida, but taking an apartment in Logan, Utah.

She and

the deceased received a marriage license in Cache County.
A Pre-Nuptial Agreement was prepared in Bex Elder County
and subsequently executed and notarized, as were
accompanying Wills of the parties.

The parties then

traveled back to Florida to reside and were married in
transit in Central/Southern Utah.

The parties set up the

marital domicile and resided in Florida until the
deceased's death.
6.

That it is uncontroverted that the bulk of the

decedent's property is in Utah with the exception of a
condominium unit in Florida, and that during the course of
the marriage, he frequently returned for periods of time to
the state of Utah, County of Box Elder, to look after his
business interests and holdings here while maintaining his
domicile in Florida•
7.

That it is uncontroverted that Florida law

requires only that a Pre-Nuptial Agreement be executed as
contrasted with Utah' law which requires adequate
FLORENCE
and
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disclosure.

There is no Utah case law directly addressing

the conflict of laws question presented in this case,
ATTORNEYS AT
LAW
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however, precedent has been supplied by both parties in

The Matter of the Estate of:
LYMAN W. HEMMERT
Probate No. 873006067
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Page 5
support of their positions as previously outlined.
From the foregoing Facts, the Court now makes and
files its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That a review of the precedent submitted

indicates that there is a differing approach established by
many of the cases in the interpretation of marital
contracts.

This approach is, essentially, that the

matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the
intention of the parties as to the interpretation and
enforcement of contracts and relationships, in 11 AWJR,
Conflicts of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it states in part
that:

,OREXCE
and
TCHISOX

ORXEYS AT
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Where the marriage takes place in the
State in which the woman has been
domiciled but, with the intention of
the parties, which is carried out within
a reasonable time, of establishing their
common house in another State in which
the husband is domiciled, the marital
rights of the parties in the personal
property of each other owned at the
-time of the marriage is governed, as a
general rule, by the law of the State
of their contemplated and subsequently
established matrimonial domicile; such
State is to be deemed their initial
matrimonial domicile.
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This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and
New York, although it is conceded that there is a
difference of opinion among many Courts as to whether the
validity of these agreements is to be determined by the law
of the place where they are made or by the law of the
matrimonial domicile.
2.

That the Court observes that there has been no

claim, nor is there any evidence that there was fraud or
misrepresentation in the initial entering into of the
agreement and the Court specifically finds there was none.
The petitioner's position is, essentially, that she was not
informed sufficiently by virtue of the circumstances,
including her language disabilities.
3.

That one of the closer cases that the Court

could find bearing on this situation is the case of Osborn
v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern Reporter 2d, Page 814, et.
seq.

When faced with a similar questions, the Court there

stated:
FLORENCE
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The State is concerned in seeing that
its concepts of public safety are
enforced in this area because marriage
is a status exclusively regulated and
controlled by laws of the State of the
parties1 matrimonial domicile.
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The Court later stated:
There can be little question that Ohio
has the most significant contacts with
and paramount interest in the parties,
in the agreement, and in questions
concerning its validity. In view of
this conclusion, it is incumbent upon
the Court to determine the validity of
the antenuptial agreement under Ohio
law dealing with this subject.
In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and
a residence of Ohio.

The contract was executed in

Massachusetts, but the parties subsequently resided in
Ohio.

This is a situation much like the instant case.
4.

That in determining the application of the law

of the State of Utah to the facts of this case, it is
helpful to the Court to refer to Section 75-2-201 [2], Utah
Code Annotated, wherein it provides:
If a married person not domiciled in
this State dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an
elective share in property in this
State is governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death
5.
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That the surviving spouses' right to take an

elective share, which she is claiming, is dependent upon
the validity of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement.

It appears to

the Court that the intention of the Legislature of the
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State of Utah is consistent with that of what the Court
finds to be the majority of the cases in the domestic
conflict of law area and directs that those rights be
determined under the law of the place of the decedent's
domicile at death, which is consistent with the marital
domicile of the parties in this case and that the public
interests as stated in the Ohio case, are consistent with
the statutory directive previously quoted.
6.

That the Court finds that Florida Law is the

applicable law and, as provided in Florida statute 732.702
[1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure shall be required for an
agreement, contract or waiver executed before marriage".
7.

That based on the foregoing, the Estate's

Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict be and is
hereby granted.
DATED this

/
/A/

day of September, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
ORDER
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, aka,
L. W. HEMMERT,
Probate No. 873006067
Deceased.
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial en
the 12th and 13th days of July, 1990, before the Honorable
F. L. Gunnel1, Judge of the above-entitled Court.

The

Personal Representative of the above estate, Alonna Cook,
was present and represented by counsel, Brian R. Florence.
The widow of Lyman W. Hemir.ert and petitioner herein,
Rose Nagy Hemmert, was present and represented by counsel,
Ben H. Hadfield.
Immediately prior to trial, the Estate made a
Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or Motion in Limine with
the issue being the relevant law governing the
determination of the validity of the pre-nuptial agreement.
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At that time, the Court denied the motion because there was
insufficient time to address the issue appropriately and
the Estate was given the right to renew the motion at the
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conclusion cf the trial.

The instruction given to the jury

by the Court essentially incorporated the law of the State
of Utah as being the applicable law with reference to the
interpretation of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement and that Utah
law (UCA 75-2-204) required two (2) elements:
1.

A signed Pre-Nuptial Agreement.

2.

Fair disclosure prior to or incident to
the signing of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement.

After deliberation, the jury found in favor of the
petitioner finding that there was not adequate disclosure.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Estate renewed
their motion in the form of a Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict.

The Court now having had an

opportunity to review all of the material submitted in
support and opposition to the Estate's motion and having
heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a review of the precedent
submitted indicates that there is a differing approach
FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON
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established by many of the cases in the interpretation of
marital contracts.

This approach is, essentially, that the

matrimonial domicile is a better indication of the
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intention of the parties as to the interpretation and
enforcement of contracts and relationships, in 11 ANJR,
Conflicts of Laws, Section 86, Page 273, it states in part
that:
Where the marriage takes place in the
State in which the woman has been
domiciled but, with the intention of
the parties, which is carried out within
a reasonable time, of establishing their
common house in another State in which
the husband is domiciled, the marital
rights of the parties in the personal
property of each other owned at the
time of the marriage is governed, as a
general rule, by the law of the State
of their contemplated and subsequently
established matrimonial domicile; such
State is to be deemed their initial
matrimonial domicile.
This approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and
New York, although it is conceded that there is a
difference of opinion among many Courts as to whether the
validity of these agreements is to be determined by the law
of the place where they are made or by the law of the
matrimonial domicile.
ORENCE
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court observes that
there has been no claim, nor is there any evidence that
there was fraud or misrepresentation in the initial
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entering into of the agreement and the Court specifically •
finds there was none.

The petitioner's position is,

essentially, that she was not informed sufficiently by
virtue of the circumstances, including her language
disabilities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that one of the closer cases
that the Court could find bearing on this situation is the
case of Osborn v. Osborn, 226 North Eastern Reporter 2d,
Page 814, et. seq.

When faced with a similar questions,

the Court there stated:
The State is concerned in seeing that
its concepts of public safety are
enforced in this area because marriage
is a status exclusively regulated and
controlled by laws of the State of the
parties' matrimonial domicile.
The Court later stated:
There can be little question that Ohio
has the most significant contacts with
and paramount interest in the parties,
in the agreement, and in questions
concerning its validity. In view of
this conclusion, it is incumbent upon
the Court to determine the validity of
the antenuptial agreement under Ohio
law dealing with this subject.
FLORENCE
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In the Ohio case, there was a resident of Massachusetts and
a residence of Ohio.
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Massachusetts, but the parties subsequently resided in
Ohio.

This is a situation much like the instant case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in determining the

application of the law of the State of Utah to the facts of
this case, it is helpful to the Court to refer to Section
75-2-201 [2], Utah Code Annotated, wherein it provides:
If a married person not domiciled in
this State dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an
elective share in property in this
State is governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the surviving spouses1
right to take an elective share, which she is claiming, is
dependent upon the validity of the Pre-Nuptial Agreement.
It appears to the Court that the intention of the
Legislature of the State of Utah is consistent with that of
what the Court finds to be the majority of the cases in the
domestic conflict of law area and directs that those rights
be determined under the law of the place of the decedent's
domicile at.death, which is consistent with the marital
domicile of the parties in this case and that the public
LOREXCE
and
LTCHISOX

interests as stated in the Ohio case, are consistent with
the statutory directive previously quoted.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court finds that
Florida Law is the applicable law and, as provided in
Florida statute 732.702 [1988] sub. 2: "No disclosure
shall be required for an agreement, contract or waiver
executed before marriage".
IT'IS FURTHER ORDERED that based on the foregoing,
the Estate's Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the
Verdict be and is hereby granted.
DATED this

Ay-^day of September, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

F. 1. GUNNELL, Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BEN H. HADFIELD
Attorney for Petitioner
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